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INTRODUCTION 
On July 7, 2016, police officers in Dallas, Texas killed a gunman 
suspected of having just murdered five area police officers and wounded 
several others.1 The use of lethal force to end the hours-long standoff 
between police and the gunman appeared to be justified in the 
circumstances.2 The heavily armed gunman barricaded himself in an 
occupied college building, refused to surrender, and threatened to kill more 
officers.3 He also claimed to have set bombs nearby.4 Considering the 
heinous nature of the crimes that the gunman allegedly committed, the 
incident would have been notable even if the police had used a firearm to 
kill the gunman. But there were a few unique twists to the case. The police 
did not shoot the suspect.5 Instead, they retrofitted a military robot to carry 
a one-pound brick of C4, a plastic explosive.6 Officers operating the robot 
sent it into the area to approach the barricaded suspect. Then, after 
visualizing the scene through a video feed from the robot and confirming 
that the robot was next to the suspect, an officer remotely detonated the 
bomb. As expected, the suspected gunman was literally blown up.7 Many 
commentators immediately thereafter concentrated on debating various 
1 Regina F. Graham, Inside the Bullet-Riddled Community College Where Dallas Cop-Killer Micah 
Johnson Died When a Police Robot Blew Him Up After He Murdered Five Officers, DAILY MAIL (July 
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legal and ethical issues concerning police using a robot to kill in a domestic 
police situation.8 I seek here to address what should be at least an equally 
pertinent question: is it constitutionally permissible for police to use a 
bomb to slaughter a suspected felon? 
Most of the reports about the legality and ethics of the Dallas scene 
have not considered this question. The few that have cite legal experts as 
being confident in their responses in the affirmative. More specifically, the 
legal experts consistently assert that, as a matter of law, so long as a police 
officer has a constitutional right to use lethal force on a dangerous felon, 
then the means of that force is irrelevant.9 The esteemed Professor Eugene 
Volokh agrees, commenting that the deadly force rule “applies just as much 
to bomb robots as it does to guns.”10 Even a senior policy analyst with the 
American Civil Liberties Union concurs, providing a succinct summary of 
these legal experts’ common analysis: “As a legal matter, the choice of 
weapon in a decision to use lethal force does not change the constitutional 
calculus, which hinges on whether an individual poses an imminent threat 
to others, and whether the use of lethal force is reasonable under the 
circumstances.”11 
This Essay challenges this depiction of the current state of 
constitutional law. It reviews recent Supreme Court opinions on excessive 
force cases and concludes that there is no generalized and singular lethal 
8 See, e.g., Todd Feathers, Police: Robot Use in Dallas Justified, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE (July 17, 
2016, 6:55 AM), http://www.sentinelandenterprise.com/news/ci_30136930/police-robot-use-dallas-
justified [https://perma.cc/WDG4-2S7T] (raising concerns about whether robots might be asked to use 
more force than a police officer would); Nadia Prupis, Legal Experts Raise Alarm over Shocking Use of 
“Killer Robot” in Dallas, FINAL CALL (July 14, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.finalcall.com/
artman/publish/National_News_2/article_103216.shtml [https://perma.cc/2HXU-N89J] (arguing that 
problems arise from the fact that police would be programming machines designed to minimize harm to 
maximize harm instead); Hope Reese, Police Use Robot to Kill for First Time; AI Experts Say It’s No 
Big Deal but Worry About Future, TECH REPUBLIC (July 14, 2016, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/police-use-robot-to-kill-for-first-time-ai-experts-say-its-no-big-
deal-but-worry-about-future/ [https://perma.cc/5BVQ-K8QS] (discussing the potentially dangerous 
implications behind autonomous weapons performing unexpected actions). 
9 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Is It Proper for Cops to Use Killer Robots?, NEWSWEEK (July 15, 
2016, 7:50 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/it-proper-cops-use-killer-robots-480482 [https://perma.cc/
7FUZ-4FCH] (asserting that guns and explosives are legally the same in police lethal force cases); Erik 
Ortiz, Dallas Police Used Robot with Bomb to Kill Ambush Suspect: Mayor, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2016, 
4:26 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dallas-police-ambush/dallas-police-used-robot-bomb-
kill-ambush-suspect-mayor-n605896 [https://perma.cc/X9W3-83KL] (quoting Professor Seth 
Stoughton as doubting that the “method of delivery” of death is legally relevant); Jeff John Roberts, 
Why It’s Legal for Police to Kill with a Robot, FORTUNE (July 9, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/07/09/robot-bomb/ [https://perma.cc/X9W3-83KL] (quoting Professor Ryan 
Calo as stating that the bomb raises no new legal issues). 
10 Michael Nunez, Should Police Use Robots to Kill?, GIZMODO (July 8, 2016, 6:47 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/should-police-use-robots-to-kill-1783352496 [https://perma.cc/Z4U7-UN3T]. 
11 Id. 
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force rule in constitutional doctrine. At one point in time, there may have 
existed an affirmative, per se rule justifying lethal force.12 Nonetheless, 
Supreme Court precedent squarely indicates that such a rule does not now 
stand.13 All police use of force cases are subject to a reasonableness 
balancing test. In addition, within that balancing test, the type and quantum 
of force used are factors that remain relevant—even for cases involving 
lethal force—when assessing whether an officer’s specific actions 
constitute excessive force. In other words, American law does indeed 
recognize the concept of excessive lethal force. Hence, I contend that an 
officer’s use of a gun to shoot a suspect is not synonymous with blowing 
up a suspect with a bomb. 
This Essay is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of 
Supreme Court excessive force jurisprudence and introduces the balancing 
test. Part II argues that, under the balancing test, it is possible for police to 
use unconstitutionally excessive lethal force. Part III discusses the likely 
physical effects of explosives like those used in Dallas and argues that 
police use of a bomb can constitute unconstitutional excessive force in 
certain circumstances. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS REGARDING EXCESSIVE FORCE
The orienting constitutional provision used to judge whether police
used excessive force when seizing a person derives from the Fourth 
Amendment.14 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”15 It is well settled that police action in apprehending 
a suspected criminal by killing him qualifies as a seizure for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.16 
12 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
13 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam) (arguing that Garner’s statement 
about the reasonableness of using deadly force on a sufficiently dangerous felon was too general a 
comment to qualify as a clearly established rule); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–22 
(2014) (citing Garner only to clarify that the Court considers a number of factors in cases involving 
deadly force); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (“Garner did not establish a magical on/off 
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”). 
14 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
16 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. Interestingly, neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment provide protections in a scenario such as that in Dallas. The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause applies only to prisoners following an adjudication of guilt. See City of 
Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due 
process protections, which contains a “shocks-the-conscience” test for claims involving seizures, 
generally applies to pretrial detainees, such as those residing in jail. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 854 (1998). This leaves the Fourth Amendment as the sole relevant 
constitutional standard for judging the actions taken by police when seizing suspects in the field. 
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The primary standard for judging excessive force in Fourth 
Amendment cases weighs the objective reasonableness of the officer’s 
actions, considering the totality of the circumstances.17 The objective nature 
of the test means that the acting officer’s “underlying intent or motivation” 
is immaterial.18 The objective reasonableness test requires the court to 
“balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests 
alleged to justify the intrusion.”19 
A few of the relevant factors commonly utilized in adjudging the 
extent of the government’s interest in using force to seize a person include 
the severity of the crime, whether the suspect is a threat to others, and 
whether the suspect is physically resisting arrest or fleeing from police.20 
Certainly, police may use greater force to seize suspects who pose a greater 
threat to others or those who resist the police.21 
Excessive force claims regarding nondeadly police actions to seize a 
person have long been particularly concerned with the type and amount of 
force used. Courts have devoted a substantial amount of time and text to 
analyzing even minor instances of police use of force.22 A significant 
number of legal opinions are devoted to judging specific forms of force, 
such as the use of batons, handcuffs, hogties, or pepper spray.23 Other 
opinions focus on what are sometimes perceived as more intermediate 
forms of force, such as police dogs, tasers, beanbag projectiles, or carotid 
chokeholds.24 
Furthermore, judges often do not treat all instances of each of these 
forms of force equally. For example, the use of a police baton may or may 
not be justified based on how the baton is used and the degree to which a 
suspect was cooperating with the police officer.25 Handcuffing a suspect 
may be appropriate in many cases of legal arrests, but leaving handcuffs on 
too tightly and for too long may become unreasonable.26 These sorts of 
17 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9. 
18 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
19 Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
20 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
21 Id. 
22 See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
§ 3.12[D] (4th ed. Supp. 2017) (describing how courts have ruled on varying degrees of severity of
police use of force).
23 Id. § 3.12[D][1][q]. 
24 Id. § 3.12[D][3]. 
25 Id. § 3.12[D][3][a] n.2542.1.4. 
26 Id. § 3.12[D][3][e]. 
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judgments on the method and quantum of force for nonlethal force cases 
are applied to all of the ways police physically seize suspects. 
Legal commentators on the Dallas bombing who endorse the use of 
any type of force once lethal force is justified would likely not doubt that 
the form and magnitude of force remain relevant in judging the 
permissibility of nonlethal force. The commentators seem to believe that 
when lethal force is legally justified, some kind of on/off switch is 
triggered,27 and once triggered, police may permissibly use any form of 
force that may be at hand. 
However, this view of the law no longer appears to be accurate—if it 
ever was in the first instance. A focused review of the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine on Fourth Amendment excessive force cases 
demonstrates that the means and magnitude of the lethal force used are 
relevant to ascertaining whether it was excessive considering the 
circumstances. 
A. Tennessee v. Garner
The notions that there is a single deadly force rule and that deadly 
force comprises a monolithic category of force arguably derive some 
validation from a Supreme Court opinion issued three decades ago. In 
Tennessee v. Garner, the Court overturned the common law rule that it was 
per se reasonable for police to use deadly force to stop all fleeing felons.28 
The Garner Court specifically found that it constituted excessive force for 
an officer to shoot a small-statured, fleeing burglary suspect in the back of 
the head.29 
Nonetheless, the Garner Court conjectured that it would be reasonable 
to use deadly force to prevent an escape if “the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to 
the officer or to others.”30 This latter statement is likely the basis for the 
contention that Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes a single affirmative 
rule triggering the rightful use of lethal force to seize a sufficiently 
dangerous felon. Indeed, without further qualifiers, this language in Garner 
might lead one to conclude that the form of deadly force is not an issue 
because the statement generically refers to “deadly force.” In other parts of 
the Garner opinion, the Court likewise seemed to treat death in a unitary 
fashion. The opinion confirmed that the “intrusiveness of a seizure by 
27 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
28 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985). 
29 Id. at 21. 
30 Id. at 11. 
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means of deadly force is unmatched.”31 Further, a “suspect’s fundamental 
interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly 
force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial 
determination of guilt and punishment.”32 
On the other hand, the Garner decision—and multiple Supreme Court 
decisions that followed it—contain relevant standards and critical 
observations that suggest that the law does not treat all forms of deadly 
force equally. In fact, determining whether the lethal force employed in a 
particular situation amounts to excessive force calls for a balancing test that 
involves considering the form and quantum of the force used. 
B. Balancing Test
Since Garner, the Supreme Court has confirmed that all police use of 
force cases, including those clearly involving lethal force, are subject to a 
balancing test. In Plumhoff v. Rickard, a police officer fatally shot the 
driver of a fleeing vehicle.33 The Court concluded that the force used was 
reasonable under the circumstances, and cited Garner only to support 
applying the balancing test to cases involving lethal force.34 In Tolan v. 
Cotton, the police shot a resisting suspect, causing him life-altering 
injuries.35 Like Plumhoff, the Tolan opinion mentioned Garner merely to 
justify applying the balancing test.36 In City and County of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, the Court affirmed the reasonableness of an officer’s decision to 
use “potentially deadly force” by shooting the suspect multiple times.37 The 
Court again did not rely upon Garner in its decision on this issue, but 
instead referred to discussions of the reasonableness test from Plumhoff.38 
In light of the Court’s repeated insistence that the balancing test be 
applied to all police use of force cases, the remark in Garner seeming to 
issue a per se rule that it is reasonable to use lethal force to seize a 
sufficiently dangerous felon now appears to be an anomaly. The Court has 
cited the purported Garner lethal force “rule” merely one time since 
Garner, and only in dicta.39 Rather, the Supreme Court has twice 
specifically rejected the idea that Garner established any special doctrine 
31 Id. at 9. 
32 Id. 
33 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2018 (2014). 
34 Id. at 2020–22. 
35 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1864 (2014). 
36 Id. at 1865–66. 
37 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015). 
38 Id. 
39 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197–98 (2004) (per curiam). 
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for deadly force. In Scott v. Harris, the majority reasoned that “Garner did 
not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions 
whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”40 Instead, the Scott 
Court characterized the relevant comment in Garner as pontificating “about 
the factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in that case.”41 The 
Scott opinion went on to state that “[w]hether or not [the officer’s] actions 
constituted application of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether [his or 
her] actions were reasonable.”42 
Similarly, in Mullenix v. Luna, the Court confirmed that Garner’s 
statement about the reasonableness of using deadly force on a sufficiently 
dangerous felon was too general a comment to be applied to any specific 
circumstances or to qualify as a clearly established rule.43 Considering the 
Court’s various condemnations of any per se rule, there appears to no 
longer be a viable argument that Garner established a particular rule for 
deadly force cases that differs from the balancing test discussed above. 
Consistent therewith, several lower courts, relying upon the Supreme 
Court’s emphasis on applying the balancing test to all excessive force 
cases, have expressly recognized that no distinct deadly force rule survived 
Garner. These courts construe the Supreme Court rulings in Scott or 
Plumhoff as signifying that there is no strict rule that differentiates lethal 
from nonlethal force in excessive force cases. The single question is 
whether the force was objectively reasonable in the situation.44 As an 
example, a district court recently acknowledged that since the 
reasonableness review is the same whether or not the force constitutes 
deadly force, the question is whether the force used was excessive based on 
the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene.45 
40 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). 
41 Id. at 383. 
42 Id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness test “‘is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application’ [and therefore] 
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case” (quoting Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979))).  
43 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015). 
44 Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that excessive force claims are 
judged under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard); Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 
968 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he touchstone of the reasonableness inquiry was not the subjective strength of 
the officer’s belief, but its grounding in the objective facts.”); Peguero v. City of New York, No. 12-
CV-5184 (JPO), 2015 WL 1208353, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015) (discussing an analysis of the
totality of circumstances under an objective reasonable test); Stauffer v. Simpkins, No. 13-1094,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18751, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015) (explaining that a series of Supreme Court
cases show that an objective reasonableness test applies in cases involving deadly force). 
45 Lively v. Theriot, No. 6:13-2756, 2015 WL 3952159, at *4 (W.D. La. June 29, 2015). 
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In sum, the entrenchment of the balancing test and the Supreme 
Court’s departure from any magical on/off switch specifically addressing 
lethal force cases means that any supposed per se rule is obsolete. The 
balancing test also means that there is no monolithic definition of deadly 
force. If all types of lethal force were equal, then there would be no need to 
consider the nature and quality of the intrusion. 
II. EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE
Assume for a moment both the existence of a per se rule and the 
following factual circumstances: an officer uses deadly force to seize a 
fleeing or fighting suspect who poses a threat to the officer or others. Does 
that mean that there is no legal concept whereby the means or quantum of 
force used could constitute excessive lethal force, and thus be unreasonable 
and unconstitutional? 
A district court recently discussed whether the means or quantum of 
lethal force mattered.46 The Middle District of Tennessee asserted that 
Plumhoff “rejected the argument that where deadly force is reasonable, a 
police officer can still be liable for using too much deadly force.”47 
According to the court, under Plumhoff, if an officer “was justified in using 
deadly force, the sheer volume of bullets he used will not provide an 
independent avenue to liability, no matter how excessive it may seem.”48 
But this reading of Plumhoff is mistaken. The Supreme Court in 
Plumhoff qualified the relevant statement as follows: “It stands to reason 
that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a 
severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the 
threat has ended.”49 Importantly, the Plumhoff Court further commented 
that the Fourth Amendment would have been violated if the officers “had 
initiated a second round of shots after an initial round had clearly 
incapacitated” the suspect or the suspect “had clearly given himself up.”50 
Indeed, the Court in Plumhoff actually entertained the argument that, 
even if deadly force was initially permissible, the officers still used too 
much force. The Plumhoff opinion first concluded on the merits that it was 
reasonable for the officer to shoot at the fleeing felon.51 Next, the opinion 
considered the argument that “even if the use of deadly force was 




49 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014) (emphasis added). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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permissible, [the officers] acted unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots.”52 
The Court did not reject this claim out of hand, but analyzed whether the 
police fired an inappropriate number of shots, i.e., whether they had used 
excessive lethal force.53 The majority ruled that firing fifteen shots was not 
unreasonable considering the suspect continued to attempt to flee 
throughout the period the shots were fired.54 The Court likely would not 
have entertained the argument about excessive deadly force, or would have 
summarily dismissed it, if all forms and quanta of lethal force were legally 
permissible once any use of lethal force was justified. 
A. Framing the Form and Quantum of Lethal Force
The Supreme Court in many cases has not treated deadly force as 
some monolithic category. The Garner Court itself considered the form of 
force used to be important. The Garner majority pointed out that “this 
Court, by balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, has 
examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is 
conducted.”55 Further, the Court noted that, because the balancing test 
requires an analysis of the intrusion, “it is plain that reasonableness 
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried 
out.”56 The Garner opinion also cited precedent whereby “a particular sort 
of search or seizure” had been found reasonable or not.57 
Later Supreme Court opinions also focus on the form of force used. In 
Scott, the Court held that the underlying reasonableness test, whether 
applied to cases of deadly force or not, requires weighing “the use of a 
particular type of force in a particular situation.”58 Notice the Court’s 
concern in Garner and Scott, which both entailed police employing deadly 
force, with the manner or type of seizure and how it was carried out. These 
rather similar statements in Garner and Scott confirm that both the form 
and quantum of force remains a relevant aspect of Fourth Amendment 
excessive force analysis, regardless of whether or not the act amounted to 
“lethal force.” 
Indeed, in cases where the officer’s actions endanger human life, the 
Supreme Court tends to frame the issue in a way that expressly chronicles 




55 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (emphasis added). 
56 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
58 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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County of Inyo, the Court addressed a scenario involving police chasing the 
driver of a stolen car who led them on a high-speed chase at night.59 To 
stop the fleeing driver, the officers in Brower set up a roadblock by parking 
a tractor trailer across all lanes and behind a curb in the road, with the 
truck’s lights turned off.60 In addition, they placed a patrol car next to the 
parked truck with its headlights shining so that an oncoming driver would 
be blinded and unable to see the truck in its path.61 The fleeing suspect 
promptly rounded the bend at a fast pace, crashed into the truck, and died.62 
The Court in Brower did not make any conclusions on the reasonableness 
of this action (because the issue at hand was whether the roadblock 
constituted a seizure).63 But the majority did comment that the manner in 
which the police had set up the roadblock, particularly the risk and 
likelihood of death to the suspect, would be relevant to the question of 
reasonableness, which it left to the court of appeals on remand.64 
In Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court indicated that the issue before it was 
whether it was reasonable for an officer “to shoot a disturbed felon, set on 
avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate 
area [were] at risk from that flight.”65 Notice that, in this conceptualization, 
the fact that the method of force—a gunshot—was expressly incorporated 
into the specific question posed. In Scott, the Court framed the particular 
issue as whether it was reasonable to “attempt to stop a fleeing motorist 
from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s 
car from behind.”66 Similarly, in Plumhoff, the Court framed the issue as 
whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they “shot the 
driver of a fleeing vehicle to put an end to a dangerous car chase.”67 Again, 
in these latter two cases the Court fixated on the specific form and amount 
of lethal force to end high-speed chases. 
Hence, at least four times the Court carefully framed the balancing 
inquiry as not about whether any affirmative lethal force rule was triggered. 
Instead, it considered the particular form and amount of force used in light 
of the circumstances surrounding the police’s interaction with the 
dangerous suspects. Additionally, the Court indicated in Scott that Garner 
could not provide a controlling precedent where the form of lethal force 




63 Id. at 594, 598. 
64 Id. at 599–600. 
65 543 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2004). 
66 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2009). 
67 Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2016–17 (2014). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1178 
was different. According to the Court, “Garner had nothing to do with one 
car striking another or even with car chases in general . . . . A police car’s 
bumping a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a 
gun so as to hit a person.”68 The next Section provides additional support 
underlying this Essay’s disagreement with any conceptualization of deadly 
force as comprising some discrete classification. 
B. Intrusions upon Bodily Integrity
Courts regularly parse the means and quantum of police force used as 
a constitutional matter. The Fourth Amendment requires it. The 
Amendment protects one’s privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by governmental officials. Thus, when an officer’s action 
involves an assault on a suspect’s body, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that a factor in determining its reasonableness is “the extent of intrusion 
upon the individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily 
integrity.”69 This factor signifies again that all forms of lethal force are not 
synonymous for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
The Court relied on this factor in Winston v. Lee to hold that forced 
surgery to extract a bullet from the defendant’s chest to be used as evidence 
constituted an unreasonably intrusive procedure.70 The Winston Court 
distinguished a previous case that sanctioned a forced blood draw to test for 
intoxicants based on its conclusion that surgically removing a bullet was far 
more intrusive and medically risky than drawing blood.71 
The following excerpt from a lower court’s discussion of the effect of 
a taser is another example of the relevance of the physical consequences of 
a particular form of force: 
The incapacitating effects of tasers in dart mode entail unique intrusions into 
one’s bodily integrity that increase with prolonged exposure. In addition to the 
pain inflicted, tasers in dart mode result in total loss of control over one’s own 
body, immobilization caused not by any external overpowering force, such as 
a police control hold, but rather by a forced internal separation of the mind 
and body.72 
68 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting Adams v. St. Lucie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F.2d. 1563, 1577 
(11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson, J., dissenting), vacated, 982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993)). 
69 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985). 
70 Id. at 756, 766. 
71 Id. at 761, 763–64. 
72 De Contreras v. City of Rialto, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
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C. Lethal Force Is Not a Monolithic Category
Determining whether the specific police action constitutes lethal force 
in the first place is likely a red herring. Definitional issues suggest that 
courts should not focus on whether the force used was “deadly” force. The 
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the term as it is used in Fourth 
Amendment seizure law. Lower courts have tended to define deadly force 
as an action that carries a “substantial risk of death or serious bodily 
injury.”73 Yet this definition is not helpful in many cases, as determining 
the exact risk of injury resulting from police conduct is nearly impossible. 
In the words of the Court in Scott, “there is no obvious way to quantify the 
risks” created by an officer’s specific action.74 
Furthermore, many courts have understandably been unwilling to 
strictly classify particular types of weapons as always being deadly or not 
deadly.75 The rationale tends to be that any of the tools typically employed 
by police can in fact be used in a highly risky manner and that many types 
of force may thus result in the suspect’s death.76 Even tools that were 
specifically created to render nondeadly force (such as police dogs, tasers, 
or projectile weapons) can be used in an unusual way to create a substantial 
risk of serious injury or death.77 In contrast, those forms of force that are 
designed to pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as firearms, do 
not always result in serious injury or death. Recognizing these points, some 
courts refer to methods as “more” or “less” lethal than others.78 The 
Supreme Court in Scott, for instance, recognized that using a police car to 
ram a fleeing motorist’s car off the road might “pose[] a high likelihood of 
serious injury or death” to the motorist, “though not the near certainty of 
death posed by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head.”79 
73 Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2012). 
74 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007). 
75 See, e.g., Blake v. City of New York, No. 05 Cv. 6652 (BSJ), 2007 WL 1975570 (S.D.N.Y. July 
6, 2007) (indicating whether a police dog constituted deadly force depended on the factual 
circumstances); Otero v. Wood, 316 F. Supp. 2d 612, 624 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (noting wooden baton 
round firings could constitute lethal force depending on whether they were directly or indirectly aimed 
at a person). 
76 See Peabody v. Perry Twp., No 2:10-cv-1078, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46344, at *14 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 29, 2013) (discussing that a taser could create deadly force). 
77 Thomson v. Salt Lake County, 584 F. 3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Hemet, 
394 F.3d 689, 707 (9th Cir. 2005). 
78 See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 311 (2015) (per curiam) (“The court also rejected the 
notion that the deputy should have first tried less lethal methods, such as spike strips.”); Mercado v. 
City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1160 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing a weapon as “‘less lethal’ 
munition”); Whitfield v. City of Newburgh, No. 08-CV-8516 (RKE), 2015 U.S. District LEXIS 
169667, at *27–28 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015) (crediting police dogs and tasers with helping police avoid 
“comparatively more lethal force”). 
79 Scott, 550 U.S. at 384. 
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In sum, labeling the level (e.g., nonlethal, intermediate, lethal) of force 
used is not particularly useful. Rather, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his 
concurrence in Mullenix v. Luna, defining police use of force as lethal or 
not should not be an orienting focus.80 Instead, the relevant question is 
simply whether the officer’s actions were reasonable under the 
circumstances, and that question is to be answered using the balancing 
test.81 The balancing test is likely why the Court in Scott opined that other 
factors might be relevant in weighing the reasonableness of the officer’s 
actions in terms of the level of risk to the suspect. It conjectured that a 
higher probability of a suspect’s death may be justifiable if, as in the 
factual circumstances of Scott, a greater number of innocent lives were at 
stake.82 This suggests there is no magical threshold in terms of the level of 
risk for an action to constitute deadly force as a general rule, and that in 
any case the threshold in terms of the likelihood of the risk in any particular 
case may be on a sliding scale considering other foreseeable consequences. 
The concept of excessive lethal force is not one drawn from whole 
cloth. Excessive deadly force has been recognized in military situations.83 
A political scientist speaking about killing in wars and times of civil unrest 
coined the term “extra-lethal violence,” which she defines as “physical acts 
committed face-to-face that transgress shared norms and beliefs about 
appropriate treatment of the living as well as the dead.”84 This idea of extra-
lethal violence can assuredly be applied to excessive force cases in a 
domestic policing context. Fourth Amendment doctrine can act as a source 
of societal norms and beliefs concerning a person’s justifiable interests in 
his or her own privacy and bodily integrity. 
Societal and judicial disapproval of police use of gratuitous violence 
also supports the conclusion that police use of excessive lethal violence can 
be unconstitutional. Judges have recognized that force that is unnecessary 
and disproportionate may be excessive.85 This conclusion is in line with the 
80 136 S. Ct. at 312 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
81 Id. at 313. 
82 Scott, 550 U.S. at 384. 
83 Joseph Florczak, A Soldier’s-Eye View of the Homefront: Examining Domestic Military Laws 
Through the Lens of Military Doctrine, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2191, 2194 (2012). 
84 Lee Ann Fujii, The Puzzle of Extra-Lethal Violence, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 410, 411 (2013). 
85 See, e.g., Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2001) (raising the possibility that force 
used when transporting a suspect might be excessive); Williams v. Canady, No. 5:10-CV-558-FL, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421, at *20 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2014) (noting that use of force against an 
unarmed suspect may lead to the force being excessive). 
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purpose of the balancing test, as excessive force by definition cannot fulfill 
any legitimate governmental interest.86 
There is an additional ethical cliff. If the assertion was accurate that 
all forms of lethal force are synonymous in domestic policing, then police 
could use any instrument at their disposal or wreak needless havoc on a 
suspect’s mind and body, regardless of how shocking or against popular 
norms it may be. Could it really be deemed reasonable for police on the 
streets to engage in gratuitously gory forms of killing, choose unnecessary 
and disproportionately offensive methods, or use torture? Imagine law 
enforcement officers on America’s streets using such primitive methods as 
beheading, scalping, stoning, or lynching, or employing biological 
weapons. The idea that some sort of lethal force trigger would 
automatically permit any of those nefarious methods offers too much of a 
slippery slope into even greater absurdity and carnage. Of relevance, too, is 
that excessive lethal force cases involve violence perpetrated against 
someone who has not been tried or convicted of any offense. 
III. BLAST INJURIES AND EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE
As of the time of this writing, Dallas officials had not yet revealed any 
information about the condition of the suspect’s body after the explosion. 
Still, officials have disclosed the amount and type of explosive material 
used, described the site and the position of the suspect preceding the 
detonation, and permitted news agencies to tour and photograph the scene 
afterward (except for the suspect’s body).87 Together, this information can 
be used to deduce the possible effects of the explosion on the suspected 
gunman’s body. 
Dallas police detonated a one-pound block of C4 next to the suspect, 
who was at the time up against a wall in a confined area of a college 
building.88 C4 is a common type of plastic explosive, typically used in 
military settings or in terrorist activities.89 C4 is classified as a high-order 
explosive, meaning that its initiation detonates into an explosive shock 
wave with blast effects.90 To simplify, after a C4 explosion, positive blast 
pressure occurs with expanding gases rolling out in a wave from the point 
of detonation at an extreme velocity, creating a path of destruction along its 
86 Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2002); Burbank v. Davis, 227 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 
(D. Me. 2002). 
87 See Graham, supra note 1. 
88 Id. 
89 Tom Harris, How C-4 Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/c-42.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZSK5-DD2F]. 
90 Graham, supra note 1. 
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way.91 The wave then inverts as a negative blast of suction in which a 
vacuum of pressure forms toward the point of detonation.92 
The effects of a high-order explosive device, such as C4, are 
magnified in a confined environment. This means that in a closed space its 
destructive impact multiplies beyond that directly caused by the explosive 
on its own.93 Researchers in a controlled experiment set off a one-pound C4 
explosive in a confined, ten by eight by eight foot rectangular steel 
bunker.94 The size of the bomb and the area circumference in the 
experimental design appear comparable to the device and enclosed space in 
which the Dallas bombing occurred.95 The results of the experiment showed 
that overpressurization effects after the initial detonation subsequently 
caused an implosion in the center of the space, which then radiated a 
secondary pressure wave outwards.96 The shockwaves then reflected off the 
walls simultaneously and moved inwards then outwards repeatedly with 
significant magnitudes of force.97 
Overpressurization can propel nearby human bodies long distances.98 
In confined spaces, the blast may slam bodies into walls, ceilings, or 
floors.99 The force of a blast wave and its after effects can, depending on 
the circumstances, cause multiple external and internal injuries.100 Bomb 
blasts are relatively unique in their ability to impose catastrophic, multi-
systemic injuries simultaneously.101 “Blast injury” has been coined to 
describe the unique “biophysical and pathophysiological” impacts upon a 
91 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, REFERENCE MANUAL TO MITIGATE POTENTIAL TERRORIST 
ATTACKS AGAINST BUILDINGS 4-1 (2003), http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/2150 
[https://perma.cc/2RRT-855F]. 
92 Jeffrey A. Slotnick, Explosive Threats and Target Hardening Understanding Explosive Forces, 
It’s [sic] Impact on Infrastructure and the Human Body at the Fourth International Symposium on 
Tunnel Safety and Security 22 (Mar. 17–19, 2010), http://hemmingfire.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/
846/Explosive_Threats_and_Target_Hardening_Understanding_Explosive_Forces,_It_92s_Impact_on_
Infrastructure_and_the_Human_Body.html [https://perma.cc/WT4R-REV5].  
93 Id. at 23. 
94 P.C. Chan & H.H. Klein, A Study of Blast Effects Inside an Enclosure, 116 J. FLUIDS 
ENGINEERING 450, 450 (1994). 
95 See Graham, supra note 1 (describing the scene of the Dallas bombing through photographs of 
the aftermath). 
96 Chan & Klein, supra note 94, at 453. 
97 Id. at 453, 455. 
98 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EXPLOSIONS AND BLAST INJURIES: A PRIMER FOR 
CLINICIANS, www.cdc.gov/masstrauma/preparedness/primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EEP-7WRX]. 
99 Id. 
100 Sara Sidner & Mallory Simon, How Robot, Explosives Killed Dallas Sniper, CNN (July 12, 
2016, 8:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/us/dallas-police-robot-c4-explosives/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/XV45-57AA]. 
101 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 98. 
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human body that occurs when exposed to blast effects.102 Common 
consequences to a human near a detonation include traumatic brain injury, 
blast lung injury, ear canal and eyeball rupture, bowel perforation, organ 
laceration, acute renal failure, ruptured liver or spleen, testicular rupture, 
blood hemorrhaging, fracture and traumatic amputation, burns, angina, and 
sepsis.103 
A blast wave can also discharge large objects which may crush a 
person. Additionally, fragmentation causes objects within the path of 
shockwaves to break apart and become projectiles that can penetrate a 
body.104 These effects of blast injury tend to be amplified for bodies near 
walls.105 
It is very likely that the suspected gunman in Dallas sustained many of 
the various types of blast injuries just mentioned. Photographs of the scene 
after the bombing show significant structural damage to the building.106 
Walls, ceilings, and doors were torn apart, glass was shattered, and other 
visual evidence is consistent with a bomb having just exploded.107 This 
visual evidence affirms that the suspect likely experienced many of the 
catastrophic consequences of overpressurization and fragmentation 
mentioned above. His body surely would have been pummeled internally 
and externally both before and after death, likely repeatedly. 
The primary purpose of this Essay is to challenge the legal assertion 
made by several experts after the Dallas events that the form of lethal force 
is irrelevant to its constitutionality. Assuming the veracity of the facts 
released to date from police officials, it appears that it was objectively 
reasonable for officers to believe that they faced a highly dangerous subject 
who had committed heinous acts of violence. There are strong indications 
that the officers had good reason to believe at that time that extreme force, 
even that which posed a high degree of injury and death to the suspect, was 
necessary to protect the safety of other officers and civilians.108 Thus, if a 
police sniper had killed the armed suspect with a single bullet, it would 
appear to have been objectively reasonable considering the totality of the 
circumstances. 
102 James H. Stuhmiller et al., The Physics and Mechanics of Primary Blast Injury, in 
CONVENTIONAL WARFARE: BALLISTIC, BLAST, AND BURN INJURIES 241, 242 (Ronald F. Bellamy & 
Russ Zajtchuk eds., 1991). 
103 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 98. 
104 Sidner & Simon, supra note 100. 
105 Stephen J. Wolf et al., Blast Injuries, 374 LANCET 405, 406 (2009). 
106 Graham, supra note 1. 
107 Id. 
108 Sidner & Simon, supra note 100. 
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Nonetheless, the form and amount of force the police used in Dallas 
on July 7—exploding a pound of C4 in a confined space—are relevant to 
whether the police acted reasonably. The blast likely resulted in extreme 
intrusions upon the suspected gunman’s bodily integrity, both before and 
after death. 
If litigation were to arise, a court using a proper application of the 
balancing test should consider the extent of the suspect’s likely pain and 
the potential extent of the damage to the suspect’s body. Thus, information 
on the possible consequences of the bomb on the suspect’s bodily integrity 
should be relevant to determining the reasonableness of the police’s 
decision to kill the suspect using a bomb.109 
CONCLUSION 
Police officials in Dallas on July 7, 2016, took a novel approach when 
faced with an armed and dangerous suspect. Officers incapacitated him by 
blowing him up with a significant amount of explosives. Legal experts and 
the media have generally ignored the extraordinary form and extreme 
magnitude of the lethal force used to kill the suspect. However, it should 
not be presumed that the level of force used by the police was 
constitutional just because the Dallas police probably could have killed the 
suspect in some manner without violating the Constitution. Excessive force 
cases, including those involving lethal force, are judged under the Fourth 
Amendment using a balancing test that requires courts to consider the form 
and quantum of the force used. It is at least arguable that the form and 
quantum of force used in Dallas on July 7, 2016, was unreasonable in light 
of the extreme injuries the blast could predictably have inflicted on the 
suspect’s body in the location in which he was sequestered. 
109 There is one prior case in which a court was asked to determine whether a police bombing 
constituted excessive force. In 1985, a Philadelphia police officer riding in a helicopter overhead 
dropped a bomb onto a house occupied by a heavily armed revolutionary group who had been resisting 
arrest. J. Clay Smith, Jr., The MOVE Bombing: An Annotated Bibliographic Index, 31 HOW. L.J. 95, 96 
(1988). The bomb exploded on the house, causing a fire, which eventually spread and destroyed other 
homes on the block. Africa v. City of Philadelphia, 938 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Several of 
the suspects, plus a few innocent children, were killed. Smith, supra, at 97, 101. A survivor and the 
estates of certain of the deceased filed a civil suit claiming that the actions of the Philadelphia police 
during the standoff constituted excessive force. Africa, 938 F. Supp. at 1280. A jury agreed. Id. at 1281. 
Nonetheless, the case on its own is not persuasive support for the proposition that killing a suspect with 
a bomb violates the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs had argued several theories in their claim, one of 
which specifically focused on the bomb being an unreasonable seizure, and it is unclear which of them 
the jury found convincing. Africa v. City of Philadelphia, 910 F. Supp. 212, 216–18 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
